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Abstract
Thematic analysis of strategic narratives employed in news texts from 31 countries/regions on
four continents showed how the January 6 insurrection was covered in places accustomed to
being reprimanded by the United States about governance and human rights. The analysis turned
on four overarching themes: reputation of the U.S., depictions of the event, underlying causes of
the event, and the political implications of the event.
Keywords: capitol riot, Donald Trump, coup d’état, strategic narrative, soft power,
January 6, 2021
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Introduction
“Be there, will be wild!” So promised U.S. President Donald J. Trump in a tweet
December 18, 2020, encouraging his supporters to rally in Washington, D.C. (Fuchs, 2021).
Trump’s months-long drumbeat of election fraud sowed seeds of distrust in the electoral process
(Brewster, 2020; Frenkel, 2020; Sanchez, 2020). His insistence that he had won a second term
was the animating force for the January 6, 2021, “Save America” rally (Fuchs, 2021). His “will
be wild” invitation to followers reflected the tenor of a reality-defying political campaign that
extended months beyond election day.
On January 6, 2021, Trump supporters massed in front of the White House to hear
speakers, including Trump himself, before they violently breached the U.S. Capitol. This forced
a rushed evacuation of lawmakers and staffers and interfered with their joint session to accept
Electoral College ballots (Fuchs, 2021). The U.S. Capitol riot, documented by foreign and
domestic journalists and even by participants using social media, led to police and protester
injuries, four deaths, and vandalism. Trump supporters carried the Confederate battle flag inside
the Capitol, which rebels never accomplished during the Civil War. The last time armed
combatants breached the U.S. Capitol was during the War of 1812. 
People around the world were shocked to see the violence, chaos, smoke bombs and
selfies. The haze of tear gas and the flash-bangs of crowd control measures rose in a figurative
immolation of Western idealism and supremacy. Internationally, journalists reported the swift
international reaction. Political leaders offered context to their home audiences and condolences
to the United States, whose promotion of democracy reflects its soft power. How were these
scenes received among the countries accustomed to U.S. peacekeeping operations, lectures about
democracy, and peaceful election exhortations? To understand how the crisis played out on the
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world stage and the implications for the U.S. post-Cold War perception of itself as a “force for
universal political good” (Mitchell, 2016, p. 16), we studied global digital news media articles
reflecting coverage across four continents reflecting 31 nations or regions. 
Theorization and Literature Review
Strategic Narratives and Soft Power
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle’s (2013) concept of strategic narratives underscores
the importance of the new media environment in which increasing numbers of people have
access to social media and online information. Social media enables ordinary people to interact
with political and media organizations and with each other. Although elites can no longer
monopolize control over communication, political leaders use narratives strategically “to create
commonsense understandings of the past, present, and future,” to garner legitimacy for particular
policies (p. xi) and to shape domestic and international actors’ behaviors (p. 2). So foreign
policy-makers pursue a twin-track strategy: They use the media ecologies of the day to
emphasize topics and frames of national interest; and compete to shape these ecologies, whose
infrastructure privileges certain voices and certain ways of communicating. Miskimmon, et al
(2013) agree with Entman (2003) that political leaders, journalists, and other elites shape public
opinion by framing (see Goffman, 1974). But while framing must be considered, they argue that
frames lack the temporal and causal features of narratives, so cannot explain causes or future
outcomes.
Miskimmon, et al. (2013; see also 2017, Roselle et al., 2014) interpret Nye’s (2005)
concept of “soft power” as referring to the shaping of geopolitical influence through images of a
nation, which mainly result from strategic narratives. The connection between soft power and
communication is crucial to our work. As a democratic hegemon, the United States is hostile to
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efforts by foreign powers to cultivate democracy on its shores. By “persistently presenting itself
as the arbiter of democracy” (Mitchell, 2016, p. 157), the United States ignores how its political
dysfunction could attract repudiation and intervention abroad. Much of the U.S. post-war
democratizing work has followed military intervention, including within the former Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya (all in our sample). Recipients of U.S. democratizing efforts often
resentfully perceive the attention as suggesting they are weak and/or poor. With Russia seeing
itself as a powerful bestower rather than a recipient of favor, President Vladimir Putin ejected
USAID workers from Russia in 2012 (Mitchell, 2016). Now, the United States enjoys less
opportunity for influence when preaching democracy (Mitchell, 2016). Russia and China
exercise their own soft power in exporting ideals.
News Flows and U.S. world news
Considerable research looks at international news flows and the extent to which these
reflect the politics, economy, and culture of the larger global system. Galtung and Ruge (1965)
predicted national economic, social, and political agendas, as well as geographic characteristics
determine the volume and kind of coverage a country gets in foreign news media. In the
changed, post-Cold War era, Wu (2000) found that mainly trade volume and presence of
international news agencies determined the volume of foreign news. The U.S. got by far the most
coverage. Wu suggested that U.S. news gets picked up simply because it is about the U.S., with
its political-economic strength, military muscle, and formidable media and cultural industries.
Researchers agree that U.S. news outlets’ foreign coverage is uneven: countries not of
strategic interest to the U.S. get little attention (Aalberg et al., 2013; Wu, 2000). This strategic
deployment of resources was already found in 1956, when, looking at14 newspapers from
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around the world, Schramm (1959) found that the amount of coverage was not proportional with
a country’s size (see also Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977). It’s also a matter of agenda-setting: the
more coverage a nation gets, the more likely readers are to think the nation is vital to U.S.
interests; the more negative coverage a nation gets, the more likely readers are to think
negatively about the nation (Wanta et al., 2004). Compared to the control condition, experimental
subjects who read news framing China as a U.S. competitor were less favorable to China;
participants who read news about shared Chinese-U.S. interests had favorable opinions regarding
China (Brewer, 2006). The same was true about Russia. 
Major U.S. news outlets give Latin America far less coverage than its geographic
proximity predicts (Weaver et al., 1984). New York Times and Washington Post op-eds and
editorials about Latin America in 2011- 2012 centered on what was problematic for the United
States, implying that editorial elites view Latin America as newsworthy only in the context of its
relationship to the United States; a second focus was crime and corruption (Golan & Munno,
2014). U.S. news coverage results in U.S. audiences thinking of Mexicans as criminals and
threats (Aguirre et al., 2011). Hafner-Burton and Ron (2013) claim a U.S. bias against Latin
America results in disproportional news attention to human rights violations there while
neglecting similar violations elsewhere.
U.S. media coverage of Africa often features patronizing, colonial tropes about poor
governance, and negative frames related to crisis, corruption, disease, conflict, and undemocratic
elections (de Beer, 2010; Domatob, 1994; Schraeder & Endless, 1998). These narratives offer
“Afro-pessimism,” i.e., a “tendency to homogenize the ‘African tragedy,’ concluding that Africa
has neither the political will nor the capacity to deal with its problems” (Ahluwalia, 2000, p. 30).
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U.S. and other Western news about African elections typically employ narratives that imply
undemocratic and illegitimate processes marred by civil unrest and violence (Behnke, 2019).
Guzman’s (2016) analysis of news of anti-Mubarak protestors found that CNN
emphasized their education and democratic goals and rationalized protester violence as a
response to government aggression, while Fox and the AP framed anti-government protesters
more negatively early in the Arab Spring but gradually both moved to portraying them as
rational, fighting for democracy; secularism was associated with rationality. Western media
typically focused on human rights and personal stories of Arab Spring protest victims but rarely
expressed support when confronted with anti-establishment protestors who would fundamentally
change their countries’ relationships with the West (Rasul & Asim, 2014).
International news about the US
Although far less research looks at international coverage of U.S. politics, a couple of
studies consider the issue of global attention to the U.S. President. McClory (2017) claims the
United States has been unique in showing the “Peaceful Transition of Power,” making this the
symbol of American democracy and a model for the world; U.S. election processes demonstrate
to both internal and external audiences how democracy functions. McClory (2017) attributes the
significant global decline in the U.S. standing to narratives around the 2016 election. Farnsworth
et al. (2013) likewise say global audiences have “grown increasingly skeptical of White House
motives as a result of media reports that often condemn US leaders and policies” (p. 2). An
examination of how European newspapers covered the 2008 US Presidential election found that
temporal aspects, particularly the stage of the campaign and polling trends, were especially
influential (Vliegenthart et al., 2010).
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Highly relevant here is Kluver et al. (2019), who also use Miskimmon et al. (2013) to
suggest that media narratives provide “strategic narratives” that embody national geopolitical
consensus. They applied this theory to international coverage of the 2016 U.S. presidential
election and its immediate aftermath—notably, the other bookend to our study. They studied how
China, Russia, Iran, and the Arab world frame news of global events to shore up local or national
identities, political values, and processes, thereby strengthening their own preferred strategic
narrative and promoting political change or stasis at global and local levels. The U.S. president is
the most visible symbol of the United States for much of the world. Therefore, Kluver et al.
(2019) say, foreign media narratives about the U.S. election provide insight into how other
countries make sense of U.S. democracy and reflect local understandings regarding U.S. policy
toward those nations:
Because the election is the embodiment of U.S. political processes and values, which the
United States actively propagates as a model for the world, it provides a unique
opportunity for governments, media outlets, and individuals around the world to reflect
upon, critique, or affirm U.S. politics… (p. 110).
They found near-contempt for the United States and its systems. For many Chinese, Russians,
Iranians, and Arabs, the U.S. 2016 election confirmed the superiority of a less democratic system
of governance: “Why should we yearn for democracy … when democracy leads to this kind of
chaos?” Kluver et al. (2019) did find differences. For example, Russian media clearly preferred
Trump. Arabic media clearly preferred Clinton. Nevertheless:
Overwhelmingly, the election process, with all the scandals, red herrings, and
weirdness, undermined the coherence of the larger U.S. strategic narrative about
democracy. Media outlets consistently criticized the candidates, the values, and the
processes of the election, and to much of the world, showed just what a sham U.S.
politics is (p. 110).
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Ultimately, the narrative paradigm demonstrates the role of global values in the
contestation of strategic narratives. 
Research questions
We asked two questions about January 6, 2021, as an unusual event that international media
could leverage for their strategic narratives:
RQ1: How did coverage of the Capitol Riot unfold in countries used to hearing lectures by
the United States?
RQ2: What did news outlets say about the impacts of the event on the U.S. image?
Method
Data
To draw a breadth of coverage of the January 6 riot, we sampled articles that ran January
6 through January 13, 2021. Articles from news outlets across five continents reflect
international coverage especially in regions on which the U.S. has opined about electoral and
human rights conditions. Locales were sampled from the following geopolitical regions: 
● Latin America: Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil 
● East Africa: Kenya and Uganda
● West Africa: Nigeria
● Southern Africa: South Africa and Zimbabwe
● Asia Pacific: China, the Philippines, and Taiwan 
● South/Central Asia: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan
● West Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
● Middle East: Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon
● Eastern Europe: Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Belarus
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● The Baltics: Lithuania and Estonia
Articles were a mixture of English-language and national languages, as detailed in Table 1. 
The articles were collected using Nexis Uni and Newsbank databases and websites of
some individual news outlets. Database searches started with keyword queries for “Capitol” OR
“Washington” OR “United States.” Since the databases may not include some relevant news
outlets, region experts on the research team manually searched local news websites. Op-eds,
editorials and news stories were included but not wire articles or raw, breaking news updates.
Purposive sampling identified one to four articles from each news outlet that contained any
depth. The final corpus consisted of 122 news articles. All non-English articles were translated
using Google Translate, checked by the researcher most familiar with the original language.
Approach to thematic analysis
The overarching themes emerged through an iterative process involving identifying key
features of text segments (Guest et al., 2012). Each author coded five articles for a first round of
inductive coding and mapped emerging themes in their areas of regional expertise. Each
researcher then cross-referenced observed themes from different regions. During a group
discussion, we categorized codes with similar characteristics, which were consolidated into a
structure of overarching themes and subcategories (see Table 2). News articles, we found,
utilized four overarching themes for the January 6 event: the reputation of the U.S., depiction of
the event, underlying causes of the event, and the political implications of the event. A
standardized codebook was developed to code articles on the subcategories and used to code the
rest of the samples. A region expert was the primary coder for each article; at least one
cross-checker ensured coding was consistent.
Findings
RIOT ON THE HILL 11
U.S. democracy: Weakened or resilient?
A central frame was the debate over the status of U.S. democracy. The sampled news
coverage and commentary overwhelmingly framed the event as a mark of declining and
weakening democracy. The event was treated as a watershed moment when violence displaced
the U.S. tradition of peaceful transfer of democratic power. For example, one Russian news
outlet described the event as “an irreparable blow” for American democracy. Mexican coverage
described the U.S. as “a shaky and delegitimized democracy,” operating “a setup typical of a
banana democracy.” Indian media outlets, meanwhile, often painted the events as an assault on
democracy itself; one headline read, “4 dead, democracy wounded, as US stumbles out of Trump
nightmare.” A Brazilian article observed that the reputation of the U.S. had been so badly
shattered that “today, no one would look at the U.S. and say, ‘I want my country to work like
this.’”
In particular, opinion pieces published in countries that were recently the site of
controversial elections mocked America’s fall from grace. A Russian op-ed cast the event as “a
complete and final discredit of the two-century-old American democracy myth.” Similarly, a
Zimbabwean commentary stated the “US now stands for ‘United States of Anarchy.’” A Kenyan
commentary suggested American democracy had fallen from first-world to third-world status in
four years. News content in Eastern European media also described the U.S. as a “third world
country” and “banana state.” Further, in Croatia and Serbia, the syntagm “cradle of democracy”
was often ironically used to describe the U.S.
Nonetheless, while some writers dismissed U.S. democracy as a myth, news media from
Ukraine (which has its own conflict with Russia), Nigeria, and Lebanon considered the January 6
event as proof of the resilience of U.S. democracy. U.S. institutions were lauded for being strong
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enough to withstand the challenges posed by the rioting, often in contrast to the local institutions
perceived to be weaker. At least as compared to other countries, the U.S. was framed as the
one—if not the only—state that could withstand such an attack on its democracy. A Ukrainian
op-ed declared “America is the most powerful of the remaining empires; it can afford political
upheavals.” In Bosnian media, that resilience theme emerged in the celebration of Vice President
Mike Pence as a “savior” of American democracy, putting the country’s interest before that of his
boss. A Nigerian publication contrasted the strengths of U.S. institutions to local political
realities: American democracy successfully weathered the challenge posed by the January 6 riot,
“unlike Nigeria, which keeps on failing most democratic stress tests that she is exposed to, no
matter how faint it may be.” A Filipino article quoted a tweet by the country’s Foreign Affairs
that stated U.S. democracy was so strong that the country could “cope with a civil disturbance
and fight wars on 3 fronts if it wants to—and come out the winner.” As summarized by a UAE
columnist, “the American legislative system passed this test.”
Shattered image and diminished global standing
Many news articles suggested the U.S. lost its glory and its image was shattered abroad.
Some news stories detailed how American legislators needed to duck behind desks for safety,
after civilians overpowered security forces and breached the Capitol. Other articles referenced
humiliation and irony by using images of the U.S. Capitol surrounded by protestors, and
hundreds of security officers—images mostly associated with struggling and failed states.
Building on this perceived diminished global standing, the U.S. also was framed as having lost
the moral ground from which to preach democracy. News media criticized U.S. hypocrisy for
policing democracy around the world while failing to uphold democratic norms at home. For
instance, a Zimbabwean publication critiqued past U.S. sanctions and its criticism of
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Zimbabwe’s democracy. It quoted President Emmerson Mnangagwa, saying: “Yesterday’s events
showed that the U.S. has no moral right to punish another nation under the guise of upholding
democracy.”
Similarly, an Iranian article repeatedly used the word “irony” to describe January 6,
calling American democracy “a masquerade” and delegitimizing the U.S.’s international attempts
to spread democracy. Chinese media also mocked previous U.S. efforts to spread democracy and
noted that the U.S. finally had swallowed “the bitter fruit of ‘democracy.’” According to one
Chinese opinion piece’s blunt headline: “US should be careful of an ‘American Spring.’” In
Uganda, where presidential campaigns were at fever pitch, the U.S. was urged to stay away from
upcoming elections and not lecture the country. One news article quoted a Ugandan cabinet
minister saying, “the Americans should not come here and try to teach us democracy.”
The U.S. was criticized for a double standard, treating its own rioters differently than
those abroad. For example, Chinese media challenged how American politicians appreciated
Hong Kong protests as “beautiful” but condemned the January 6 rioters. An editorial in a
state-owned Zimbabwean newspaper also suggested the U.S. should not be so quick to legitimate
claims of voter fraud in other countries, just as it dismissed Trump’s claims. The hypocrisy
charge was also visible in Afghani media: one article called out U.S. hypocrisy for its treatment
of Middle Eastern countries who have encountered similar democratic crises. The same Afghani
editorial noted, “the U.S. rulers should not dare to ridicule demonstrations in the world
particularly in the so-called ‘Third World’ countries as barbaric acts as Thursday’s incident in
Washington D.C. was the most ridiculous in the most developed country.” News and
commentary in some countries including Zimbabwe and Uganda went a step further, suggesting
their own democracies were just as good, if not stronger than, America’s. “What transpired at
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Capitol Hill has not happened in any third world nation which they portray as being backward,”
a Zimbabwean newspaper reported.
A Serbia writer challenged the credibility and underscored the hypocrisy of U.S.-based
institutions (namely Freedom House) in the context of a local protest: “It would be very
interesting if we got a report from Freedom House or some similar American organization, which
would compare the actions of the state in front of the parliaments in Belgrade in July and
Washington in January. We believe that the Belgrade action would now be assessed as flawless.”
Labelling the event and actors
News media mostly employed highly charged phrases and negative language in
describing the event, coalescing around four sub-themes. Unsurprisingly, many descriptions of
the event acknowledged the violence witnessed on January 6. Terminologies used to convey the
idea of violence include “chaos,” “mayhem,” “vandalism,” “storming of the U.S. Capitol,”
“security crisis,” “acts of barbarism,” “rampage,” “scenes of violence,” “brutal rebellion,” and
“invasion.” The January 6 event was also described as an act intended to overthrow the U.S.
government. This was mostly conveyed through phrases such as “coup,” “coup d’état,” and
“insurrection,” as well as comparisons with attempts to overthrow governments in other parts of
the world. For example, a Filipino editorial opened with the headline: “Coup d’etat in America.”
A Croatian columnist stated: “The country, which exported democracy, yesterday exported a
coup d’etat via live broadcast to the world. Furthermore, Serbian media described participants of
the January 6 event as being interested in “overthrowing the US government.”
News outlets also framed the January 6 event as unusual and even historic. A Serbian
news outlet noted that the event “shocked and appalled the entire democratic world”; a UAE
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columnist observed, “the world is stunned”; and a Pakistani outlet reported the event had
“shell-shocked not only the American public but also the rest of the world.” Similarly, a Mexican
outlet reported that “the chaos and scenes never seen in Washington … left the world surprised.”
A Venezuelan op-ed described surprise in how January 6 events unfolded: “While I was
surprised that the ‘law and order’ voters dared to reach these extremes, I still thought that they
would stop before it became an actual rebellion.” Likewise, a Pakistani outlet posited that while
the events witnessed in the U.S. Capitol would be somewhat normal in some jurisdictions, they
“were quite shocking” coming from the U.S. Notably, some descriptions converged around the
idea of terrorism. Indian media, for example, referred to the riots as a “domestic terror attack.”
An American columnist in a Lithuanian newspaper noted that “a large group of Donald Trump
supporters committed an act of domestic terrorism by invading the Congress.” The terrorism
sub-theme was also implied when Croatian, Lithuanian, UAE, Filipino, and Afghanistan writers
referred to the January 6 participants as “terrorists” or “domestic terrorists.”
January 6 participants were described in mostly unflattering and sometimes strong
language, including extremists, mob, right-wing hardliners, and potential domestic terrorists. For
example, Taiwanese media commentary described the active participants on January 6 as a
“mob” and “seditionist terrorists”; a Bosnian commentator labelled them “a raging mob” and
“invaders”; and in Brazil, where President Jair Bolsanaro is called “the Trump of the Tropics,”
journalists described the actors as “vandals” and “militants.” Indian media, meanwhile, described
the protestors as “white supremacists,” “thugs,” and “racists,” and, at one point dismissively
referring to them as “flotsam and jetsam” washing up on the steps of the United States Capitol
Building. However, an Afghani piece suggested the January 6 actors were not actual Trump
supporters. Brazilian media quoted government officials who praised participants; for example,
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Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernesto Araújo was quoted describing the actors as “good
citizens” exercising their right to question the electoral process. Similarly, a Nigerian article
described Trump and his supporters as “protesting against electoral malpractice.” However, this
favorable framing of the actors was minimal compared to the more dominant negative
descriptors.
Some news content featured relatively mild terminology, such as the frequent use of the
word “protestors” in Chinese media. Notably, news media content across different geographies
employed descriptors that tied the actors to Trump. These included descriptors such as “goons
allied to disgraced U.S. President Donald Trump,” “pro-Trump supporters,” “pro-Trump
Americans,” “pro-Trump extremists,” “supporters of Trump invasion of the Capitol,”
“Trumpists,” “Trump supporters,” “MAGA extremists,” and “die-hard supporters” of Trump.
Blame
While the January 6 event was attributed to a variety of actors and circumstances, news
coverage and commentary overwhelmingly apportioned most of the blame on then-President
Donald Trump. Direct or implicit blame was evident in labelling the active participants as
“pro-President Trump supporters.” Among the materials explicitly faulting Trump for inciting
the event, a Zimbabwean editorial argued Trump had spoken to thousands of people and after
“inflaming them in a speech launched them towards the Capitol building”; it added, “Mr. Trump
carries a lot of the blame.” A Mexican news outlet referred to a “revolt fueled by the president
himself”; it asserted, “The assault on Congress came shortly after the protesters had been
harangued … by the outgoing president, who repeated the string of unfounded fraud allegations
that he has insisted on since his defeat was confirmed.” Likewise, Indian media outlets firmly
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affixed blame to Trump; one described him as a “disgraced President who was blamed across the
political spectrum for igniting violence.” Similarly, Ukrainian media framed Trump as the “one
person responsible for absolutely everything that happened,” citing Trump’s tweets before and
during the event, and his perceived reluctance to dissuade his supporters from violence. A
Taiwanese article argued that the event was a “pathetic last gasp” of Trumpian virulence in
challenging democracy. Among media in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Trump
was vilified as a “jerk,” “coward,” “dangerous ignoramus,” “fool,” “shameful,” and
“irresponsible.” Nonetheless, some post-Soviet countries sympathized with Trump, framing him
as “only an indicator of the problem, and not the problem itself.” A Belarussian columnist
defended Trump, arguing that “the fierce persecution of the president … is beyond common
sense and only deepens the existing conflict.” Likewise defending Trump, Armenian media
suggested someone else behind the scenes “provoked crowd frenzy”; Trump merely “found
himself” cast as villain.”
Blame was also extended to Trump supporters, Republican and Democratic party
politicians, failed economic policies that had disenfranchised some Americans, neoliberalism,
interventionism, the exploitation of the democratic system by politicians for self-interest,
globalization, the rise of China, and failed U.S. military policies. Some Serbian media regarded
the problem as an extension of U.S. white supremacy; Croatian media described it as a
“culmination of a multi-year political agony” worldwide. The American political class were also
lambasted in a Lithuanian op-ed stating, “too many politicians in the United States fan the flames
of unhealthy division and conflict.” Likewise, a Bangladeshi commentator opined that a
“dangerous anti-democratic mindset has been reared by the Republican party for quite some
time.” An Azerbaijani newspaper cited a Ukranian source who heard “exclamations and orders in
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Russian” in a video recorded at the Capitol as back-up for its “very serious suspicions" about
Moscow’s involvement in the insurrection. The Ukrainian source’s accusation of Russian
involvement  could be understood in the context of the drawn-out conflict  between Ukraine and
Russia since 2014. Interestingly, Russian media blamed U.S. institutions for failing to address
Trump’s voter fraud concerns, questioned the transparency of U.S elections, and accused
Democrats of destroying the U.S. political system in a quest to defeat Trump. Meanwhile, some
Middle Eastern news outlets accused social media companies of either over-regulating or
under-regulating their platforms. An Saudi Arabian op-ed condemned social media companies
for enabling the spread of conspiracy theories and hatred that fueled the January 6 events and
other incidents across the globe. Demanding more regulation, the author singled out Facebook as
“the platform on which makeshift militias organized to attack Rohingya communities.” In
contrast, an Iranian news outlet criticized Twitter’s allegedly double standard in banning Trump
after January 6 but ignoring Trump’s previous threats to attack Iranian cultural sites.
 Historic and metaphorical references
International news media reportage drew on several important historic moments and
metaphors to make sense of January 6. Iconic moments of political stress mentioned included the
1963 assassination of President John Kennedy, Japan's 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, and the 1995
bombing of an Oklahoma City government building. Croatian and Serbian narratives referenced
communism and socialism, and compared Trump to both modern-day (Putin and Xi Jinping) and
historical (Lenin, Napoleon, Mussolini and Franco) authoritarian leaders. The events were
compared to the rise of fascism, Nazi Germany and the Bolsheviks’ assault on the Winter Palace.
Russian media offered comparisons to the 1993 political stand-off between the Russian
president Boris Yeltsin and parliament that ended only after military forces stepped in. Armenian
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media referenced internal protests that began in fall 2020: “The main characters in both places
were … supporters of all-crushing brute force with a noticeable lack of brains.” 
Some Nigerian media, meanwhile, contrasted the riots with historical political conflict
there: “Nigeria is in its 22 years of unbroken democratic practice, dating back to 1999 when the
military regime was terminated.” Afghani media referred to Leninism to emphasize Trump’s
sycophantism and willingness to subvert the rule of law. To analyze the event’s deep-rooted
causes, Taiwanese media referenced 19th-century U.S. nationalism and the Republican Party’s
1968 “Southern strategy.” A Brazilian commentator predicted the U.S. would remain divided
after January 6: “the national unity that existed after 9/11 and Pearl Harbor no longer exists.”
International implications
News media also engaged with the likely international implications and impact of
January 6.  A Venezuelan op-ed called the event a “blow not only to American democracy, but to
democracy everywhere.” Some Chinese media framed the event as evidence of receding Western
power and the rise of alternative non-democratic systems. Relatedly, a Brazilian commentary
discussed the likely reorganization of the hierarchy of power in the global stage, noting that the
U.S. faces the unsuitable mix of its eroding soft power and a much more challenging geopolitical
environment in which China is flourishing. The author wondered: “Would this then be a great
opportunity for Beijing to turn the tables against Washington?” A Taiwanese news outlet warned
that the rioting could occur elsewhere and urged attention to similar social problems abroad that
could escalate if not handled properly.  Others also worried that the events would inspire
authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world. For example, a Bangladeshi commentator
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observed that “authoritarian rulers will find excuses and try to justify their actions using these
images … the worrying lesson is, if it is possible in the U.S., it can happen anywhere.”
These news media were presumably careful in choosing which world leaders and national
leaders to use as news sources. Leaders mostly condemned the events as an attack on the concept
of democracy. For instance, Zimbabwean media quoted UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson
saying; “The United States stands for democracy around the world, and it is now vital that there
should be a peaceful and orderly transfer of power,” and cited the French foreign minister
describing the events as a “a grave attack against democracy.” An Indian publication exclusively
quoted British Commonwealth leaders. Nigerian articles frequently cited regional or global
powers such as Iran, China, and Russia. The granularity of source selection also varied, with
some publications quoting only top-level leaders such as prime ministers and presidents, while
others cited a wider variety of sources such as parliamentary or congressional members, political
cabinet members, executives of nonprofit organizations, party officials, and journalists.
Implications for Local (National) Politics
News media content also contemplated the implications for local politics and democracy.
For instance, one Indian article discussed how political instability in the U.S. might affect Indian
foreign policy with Russia; another compared Trump’s actions toward supporters and political
enemies to similar actions by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Parallels were drawn
between ongoing protests within the U.S. and India. Nigerian coverage questioned the very idea
of democracy as a desirable form of government. One newspaper quoted a University of Lagos
professor who asked, “If America, one of the greatest democratic states, has become the way it is
today, shouldn’t the international system begin to think of other alternatives?”
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Mexican coverage highlighted Trumpian tendencies in its own president, Andrés Manuel
López Obrador (AMLO), warning that America’s woes could come home to roost “because
Presidents López Obrador and Donald Trump are like two drops of water; because AMLO bet all
his political capital on Trump's re-election, because they are far from being Democrats and
because they are two crazy people with power.” Again, some Brazil coverage drew parallels with
its own President, “an extreme-right wing radical, unpredictable, loyal to Donald Trump and
capable of making decisions contrary to his own country's interests.” Conceding "lots of fraud
claims" in American elections, one writer suggested these statements could negatively impact
relations between Brazilian leaders and incoming U.S. President Joe Biden. Brazil’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ernesto Araújo used January 6 to advocate paper ballots for Brazil’s 2022
elections.
News media in the Middle East expressed hope that U.S. attention to domestic issues
would cause decreased American presence in the region. Bosnian media offered a cautionary
tale. Local politicians repeatedly warned that “no matter how powerful and important they are,
political leaders are never stronger than the state and the people.” Contrastingly, a Zimbabwean
op-ed used the January 6 event to dismiss voter fraud claims launched by the opposition after the
country’s last election. Notably, South African and Filipino news media described the active
involvement of their nationals in the January 6 event as unfortunate and embarrassing.
Race and Racism
Race and racism in U.S. society also emerged as a frame, particularly in critiques of
Trump, in contrasting security forces’ actions on January 6 to prior Black Lives Matter protests,
and in explaining U.S. society. An Iranian article advocated transitional justice, arguing that
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“systemic inequality is a defining feature of American democracy, as is white privilege.”
Likewise, Indian news media described the protesters as “racist, white supremacist louts” and
pointed out how rioters waving Confederate flags and erecting gallows in front of the Capitol
drew on the history of racial lynching. A Zimbabwean newspaper described the U.S. as
“intrinsically a racist society.”
A Turkish article ran with the title “This is America,” making reference to Donald
Glover’s song illustrating “the racial disparity of trying to make money and being a black person
in America.” In South Africa, with its history of apartheid, news media described the January 6
event as a “whitelash” against racial liberty, and accused the Republican Party for a decades-long
project to reversing gains made by African Americans; January 6 participants were said to have
been “driven by racist rage” and Trump was accused of leaving the legacy of “a society where
those who are fighting to preserve white supremacy are emboldened enough to equate their
anarchy to a moral revolution.”
Discussion
This comparative study set out to analyze how countries around the world who have
previously been lectured to by the U.S. about democratic governance reported the January 6
event. We examined 122 articles published by 71 media outlets in 31 countries and regions, and
observed four overarching themes: the tarnished reputation of the U.S. and weakened
democracy; depiction of the event as an unlawful and violent attack on American institutions
committed by Trump supporters; underlying causes of the event as rooted both in Trump and his
extremist supporters and in the U.S. history of racism; and international and local political
implications. Although some news media discussed the enduring strength of U.S. institutions and
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democracy, most of the coverage represented January 6 as evidence of weakening democracy.
This decline of U.S. democracy was described as lowering the status of America to that of
countries it has previously lectured about democracy and democratic governance. The U.S. was
thus discussed as having lost its moral high ground to preach democracy and criticize elections
abroad. The approach of some international news media in our sample mirrored that typically
employed by U.S. media reporting on faulty elections and dictatorial leaders in the third world.
Several reports used elected leaders of Western states to express concern and call for the peaceful
transfer of power--a common theme of U.S. leaders when Global South dictators refuse to vacate
power. 
With a few notable exceptions, the sampled media outlets usually portrayed January 6
events as an unlawful, violent attack on American institutions. Depictions of participants ranged
from disorganized mobs vandalizing the Capitol to domestic terrorists or insurrectionists
attempting to stage a de facto coup d'état at the orders of a disgraced strongman, a notion seen
commonly in U.S. media portrayals of social and political crises abroad. The clear consensus
was that, even when media outlets defended the Jan. 6 participants’ actions, the rioting was
abhorrent and conflict-ridden. A handful of media outlets portrayed the actors and activities as
civil demonstrations: one Nigerian newspaper described it as a “protest against electoral
malpractice,” while Brazilian media quoted its foreign minister as describing the protestors as
“good citizens.” January 6 nevertheless remained portrayed primarily as the result of something
gone wrong in democracy.
In explaining the underlying causes of the insurrection, media outlets most frequently
faulted Trump himself: he had made baseless, fraudulent claims about electoral fraud and incited
violence. His political supporters were similarly culpable. They were accused of being
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extremists, insurrectionists, right-wing hardliners, and militants uninterested in the democratic
process, as evidenced by their backing of a figure who the media largely ridiculed as illegitimate.
Somewhat less common, though visible, was coverage identifying the U.S. political climate as
ultimately at fault, particularly laying responsibility on Republicans and on the partisan press.
For instance, an Indian outlet condemned the 100 Congressional Republicans who voted against
certifying the electoral results, describing them as committing “treason” or “sedition.” Even
moderate Republicans who spoke against Trump and his supporters were pilloried; the outlet
derided them for resistance “after four years of enabling and acquiescence through silence.”
Other related, underlying causes of the Capitol Riot, as reported abroad, included failed
economic policies that had left millions of Americans disenfranchised and a history of racism
and white supremacy as conditions that allowed politicians such as Trump to flourish. More
explicitly authoritarian nations, meanwhile, frequently described the underlying cause of the
unrest as the fundamental failure of democratic governance and the West’s waning strength. A
Chinese outlet described the events as “the bitter fruit of ‘democracy.’” In many cases, the
underlying causes were portrayed as systemic issues not easily fixed.
Given that a global superpower can cause instability, the political implications of the
January 6 event at the local and international level were understandably also key . While
international political news sources such as heads of government focused on the need to
safeguard democratic norms, narratives also manifested around the fallibility of democracy.
Implications for local politics revealed even more interesting narratives, ranging from using the
January 6 event as a threat to “strongmen” who frustrate democracy, to using it to tacitly support
dictators. A state-owned newspaper in Zimbabwe strenuously argued that since Trump’s claims
of voter fraud had been widely dismissed, a similar stance should be adopted when such
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accusations emerge in countries like Zimbabwe: Dismissing Trump's voter fraud claims while
entertaining similar claims made by the Zimbabwean opposition in 2018 was a double standard.
In Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni has ruled for 35 years, government officials were
quoted as dismissing U.S. involvement in Uganda’s upcoming election. It appears that journalists
in countries where voter fraud claims are common and democracy is arguably weaker used the
January 6 event to dismiss calls for electoral transparency and accountability. 
Among the implications of these findings are ones that relate to foreign policy and
international diplomacy, given that widespread perception of the weakening of both the public
image of the United States and the actual stability and integrity of its institutions could lead to
significant socioeconomic and political realignments globally. This could come in the form of a
loss of so-called U.S. “soft power,” or an ability to achieve foreign policy goals through
persuasion and co-option. Soft power is significantly affected by a nation’s ability to maintain a
strong positive image with the people it seeks to influence (Nye, 2005; Goldsmith & Horiuchi,
2012). This is particularly true in regions where the United States has historically relied on soft
power to affect change, many of which were studied here. As belief in U.S. exceptionalism
fades, and as the image of the United States as a stabilizing force in the geopolitical landscape
falters, international willingness to follow America’s lead declines. While hardly a new
development—Nye identified a decline in the ability of the United States to project soft power as
early as the late 1980s—the widespread perception and portrayal of American decline by
international media outlets included in this study does suggest an added dimension to this loss of
power. Indeed, several of the countries mentioned here have challenged American
exceptionalism, sometimes covertly and other times quite overtly (see Gilmore & Rowling,
2017). In a process that Trump likely accelerated but that also predated him (Layne, 2018),
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China and Russia have demonstrated themselves as quite ready to challenge and even subsume
the hegemonic soft power of the United States. 
The portrayal of the United States as a weakened geopolitical entity facing unrest and
disarray could also provide authoritarian and autocratic leaders/governments with substantial
justification for their own anti-democratic actions and agendas. With the tarnishing of the image
of American democracy, long held up as a gold standard of democratic governance, these actors
can make claims against the efficacy of democratic systems with some legitimacy, as samples
from Chinese and Russian media in this study demonstrated. Similarly, this portrayal could
provide right-wing populist actors such as Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and India’s Narendra Modi
with counter-examples. The minority portrayal of Trump and his supporters as justified actors,
meanwhile, could propel similar actions elsewhere. According to Brazilian journalists, members
of Bolsonaro’s cabinet advocated using similar strategies to those employed by Trump. Russian
journalists highlighted the reaction of Trump and his supporters as justified responses to electoral
concerns, a method that could certainly be adapted into Russian politics. In these areas, the
American soft power vacuum could have major domestic implications.
Limitations, future research, and conclusion
This study offers substantive findings but has several limitations that could be addressed.
While an analysis of 122 articles across 71 publications in 31 countries and other regions yielded
useful data, most regions were represented by one or two publications; several potentially useful
publications’ articles were not considered due to access limitations. Additionally, sampling
methods were convenience-based, with the availability of articles within select news databases
and public-facing websites a primary determining criterion for inclusion in the sample. Including
more publications/articles from each region would, in addition to increasing potential sources of
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useful data points, provide for a more robust sample. Second, this study only examined
text-based media content. Analysis of visuals, audio, and other media formats could provide
additional important context. More research is needed to draw stronger conclusions about the
implications of this international news framing. While the 122 texts collected here represent
valuable data, they are not necessarily representative of their locales.
While this study focused on the development of strategic narratives from a media studies
standpoint, the concept of soft power has important implications in other disciplines, such as
political science and international studies. An interdisciplinary approach to the design could
yield a more holistic account of how and when international news constrains the ability of the
U.S. to project soft power. Future research could also elaborate on specific elements of these
findings that were necessarily condensed for reasons of space, such as differences in portrayals
of the events of January 6 based on the political system or the ideological bent of the
government. Comparative research might systematically focus on how different ideological or
cultural identities overdetermined how news coverage was presented and acted upon. Finally,
interviews with journalists who wrote the sampled articles could provide additional dimensions.
This analysis provides important insights into how members of the international
community discuss political turmoil within the United States, particularly those members with a
history of being lectured on democracy by the U.S. These perspectives influence how the United
States is regarded on the international stage and how a crisis in a global superpower can prompt
domestic change. Countries across the political/democratic spectrum deployed their own
strategic narratives in ways that suited both their local and international agendas.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the sampled news outlets.
Yucatan Times (Mexico) English Private
El Debate (Mexico) Spanish Private
Caracas Chronicles (Venezuela) English Independent
El Universal (Venezuela) Spanish Private
A Tarde (Brazil) Portuguese Private
Globo (Brazil) Portuguese Private
Folha de Sao Paolo (Brazil) Portuguese Private
People’s Daily [English edition]
(China)
English Party-owned
Global Times (China) English Party-owned
Taipei Times (Taiwan) English Private
The Daily Nation (Kenya) English Private
The Star (Kenya) English Private
The Herald (Zimbabwe) English State-owned
NewsDay (Zimbabwe) English Private
The Monitor (Uganda) English Private
Times of India (India) English Private
Telegraph (India) English Private
The Hindu (India) English Private
Dawn (Pakistan) English Private
The News International (Pakistan) English Private
The Express Tribune (Pakistan) English Private/New York Times
partnership
The Daily Star (Bangladesh) English Private
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The Financial Express (Bangladesh) English Private
The Guardian (Nigeria) English Private
Vanguard (Nigeria) English Private
24sata.hr (Croatia) Croatian Private
Index.hr (Croatia) Croatian Private
Klix.ba (B&H) Bosnian Private
Dnevni avaz (avaz.ba) (B&H) Bosnian Private
Kurir.rs (Serbia) Serbian Private
Blic.rs (Serbia) Serbian Private
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russia) Russian State-owned
Argumenty i Fakty (Russia) Russian Private
Izvestia (Russia) Russian Private
RIA (Russia) Russian State-owned
European Truth (Ukraine) English,
Ukranian
Other
Zerkalo Nedeli (Ukraine) Russian Private
Liga.net (Ukraine) Russian Private
The Star (South Africa) English Private
Business Day (South Africa) English Private
The Citizen (South Africa) English Private







Aravot (Armenia) Russian Private
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Haqqin.az (Azerbaijan) Russian NGO “For Human Rights”
Kaspiy.az (Azerbaijan) Russian Private
Zerkalo.az (Azerbaijan) Russian Private
Naviny.by (Belarus) Russian Private
Sb.by (Belarus) Russian State-owned
Ekho Kavkaza (Georgia) Russian Regional version of RFE/RL
Gruzia Online/Aspny.ge(Georgia) Russian Private
Kvirispalitra.ge (Georgia) Georgian Private
Saarte Haal (Estonia) Estonian Private
Postimees (Estonia) Russian Private
Delfi (Estonia) Russian Private
Lrytas.lt (Lithuania) Lithuanian Private
Respublica.lt (Lithuania) Lithuanian Private
Delfi (Lithuania) English Private




Afghanistan Times (Afghanistan) English Private
Daily Outlook Afghanistan English Private
Tehran Times (Iran) English Private
Iran Daily (Iran) English Private
The Daily Star (Lebanon) English Private
Arab News (Saudi Arabia) English Private
Khaleej Times (UAE) English Private
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Hurriyet.com.tr (Turkey) Turkish Private
CNN Türk online (Turkey) Turkish Private
Sondakika.com (Turkey) Turkish Private
Trtworld.com (Turkey) English State-owned
Table 2. Structure of overarching themes and subcategories
Overarching theme Subcategories
The reputation of the U.S. Resilience of U.S. democracy
Weakening international image 
Depiction of the event Labelling of the event
Description of actors
Underlying causes of the event Blame
Historic and metaphorical references
Race and Racism
Political implications Implications on international politics
Implications on domestic politics
